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and the Constitutional Treaty
PAOLO DARDANELLI
Centre for Swiss Politics, Department of Politics and IR, University of Kent
This volume has drawn on the experience of some prominent federal and confederal
systems in order to shed light on the transformations of the EU that may be brought
about by the Constitutional Treaty signed in October 2004. This concluding article
will focus on some key points that emerge from the case studies and offer some com-
parative reflections applied to the European Union. Four broad issues appear to have a
particularly strong bearing on the evolution of the EU. The first is naturally the signifi-
cance of the Constitutional Treaty itself, and the impact it is likely to have on the nature
of the EU’s political system. Secondly, there are questions of how the division of
policy-making competences is likely to evolve and whether a dual or a cooperative
form of con/federalism is taking root. Here the evolving role of subsidiarity may be
important, as several of the authors in this volume have suggested. Thirdly, how will
dispute resolution between the two main levels of the EU system be managed and,
in particular, is the balance between the judicial and the political elements likely to
be altered? Lastly, how will the changing nature of the EU affect the practice of democ-
racy in, and popular identification with, the Union, and what role will be played by the
evolution of collective identification with the individual European nations and with
Europe as a whole? The following sections address each of these issues in turn. In
conclusion, I offer some reflections on the ratification process.
KEY WORDS: EU, future of Europe, Constitutional Treaty, federalism, division of competences
The Constitutional Treaty and the Nature of the European Union
The debate on the constitutionalization of the European Union was not born with the
European Convention and the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty. It already has a
respectable pedigree in the field of political and legal studies of the EU, comprising
two main themes. First, many legal scholars have persuasively argued that over time
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the EU treaties have undergone a process of constitutionalization – mainly through
rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – that have transformed a set of treaties
into a quasi-constitutional document and in turn transformed the EU into a jurisdiction
in its own right based on a distinctive legal order.1 Secondly, a normative debate has
emerged over whether the EU should adopt a constitution so as to give a ‘proper’
legal framework to an entity that has turned into a highly developed political system
(Grimm, 1995; Habermas, 2001).
With the latter debate in the background, what is the significance of this Consti-
tutional Treaty and of the ‘constitutional discourse’ it has generated in the EU? The
Convention method certainly represents a break with the traditional Intergovernmental
Conferences, and the debate around the ‘Constitution’ may have generated a degree of
pan-European public debate, at least at the elite level (Shaw et al., 2003). The most
intense constitutional debate is still to come, most notably in those states that have
chosen to ratify the treaty by referendum, and the impact is likely to be significant.
Moreover, the Constitutional Treaty will certainly deepen that process of ‘constitutio-
nalization’ mentioned above, thanks to the way it was drafted and its very name, if not
by virtue of its provisions. The fact that an unprecedented proportion of states are likely
to use referendums to ratify it, further suggests that the treaty is perceived as qualitat-
ively different from its predecessors. But in other ways, the document falls short of
being a European constitution. As is evidenced by the provisions for ratification –
unanimity in the IGC negotiations and separate ratification in the 25 states, each of
which must vote in favour – it is still a treaty between states and not a supreme law
adopted by a self-governing European demos. Thus, the failure of one or more states
to ratify the treaty will present a key test of this process of constitutionalization.
The process of constitutionalization has already deeply transformed the EU from its
birth as the European Coal and Steel Community. Is the EU now on the verge of
becoming a federal state, under the Constitutional Treaty? The Swiss and American
experiences, in different ways, show that the answer to this question may not always
be unambiguous. Switzerland’s transition from a confederation of states to a federal
state was not initially entirely clear-cut and a number of legacies of the past have
remained well into the twentieth century. In the early US, as Delaney shows (this
volume, p.), a great deal of ambiguity and conflict as to the meaning of the ‘original
pact’ was not fully clarified until after the 1861–65 civil war. Baier argues that by
the very fact of using constitutional language, the Constitutional Treaty moves
Europe in a more federal direction. And yet, while this is largely true, there appears
to be consensus among the contributors that the treaty will still fall short of turning
the EU into a federal state. As Hable points out, the treaty does not make substantial
constitutional changes to the nature of the EU. Indeed, if the expression had not effec-
tively been discredited by partisan usage in the UK, it would be tempting to conclude
that the treaty is indeed an exercise of constitutional ‘tidying up’. In any case, if it does
not make the EU a federal state, it will strengthen certain federal elements. The EU
is likely to continue to face pressures for further integration, but it is likely to
proceed in its traditional piecemeal fashion, thus avoiding a ‘big-bang’ transformation
into a fully-fledged federation, at least for the foreseeable future. Paradoxically, if the
EU fails to transform itself into a federal state, the creeping centralization noted by































accountability is likely to continue as the member states seek to preserve the vestiges of
state sovereignty. While nationalists will welcome this, democrats have reasons to be
worried, as discussed in more detail below.
The ability of the EU’s constitutional architecture to adapt to these pressures will be
important. Journalistic commentaries on the Convention process and the Constitutional
treaty, especially in the UK, have often compared the European experience unfavour-
ably with the American one. From a pragmatic point of view, however, the fact that this
constitution is unlikely to achieve iconic status may well turn out to be a blessing for
the EU, as constitutional amendments and adaptation to changing circumstances may
well be easier to accomplish if the constitutional charter is not ‘sanctified’. It is true that
many federal states, including Canada, Germany and the US, have evolved over
decades or even centuries with their constitutional frameworks virtually unchanged.
By contrast, Switzerland has seen frequent constitutional amendments and the adoption
of two entirely new constitutions. The EU has been in a state of almost continuous con-
stitutional change since 1986 and appears similar to the Swiss case in this regard. From
his Belgian perspective, Wilfried Swenden (this volume, p.203) sees merits in this
method of incremental transformation and piecemeal constitutional change, consider-
ing it better suited to a complex, multi-national political system such as the EU.
Much of the debate about federalism assumes statehood and yet, as Bo¨rzel makes
clear, federalism is not necessarily wedded to statehood, and the EU need not be con-
ceptualized using traditional state-centric categories (see also, Koslowski, 1999). This
is certainly seductive at an abstract, quasi-normative level but appears to me to be more
problematic from an empirical, positive standpoint. I would argue that any discussion
of federalism in the context of the European Union cannot ignore statehood entirely for
the obvious reason that the EU is composed of states, and not just any states but those
states such as France that have historically defined what it is to be a state.
The Division of Competences and the Principle of Subsidiarity
One of the main tasks of the Convention, and indeed the challenge that inspired
the workshop from which this volume originates, was to clarify the division of
competences between the states and the Union. Judged against this yardstick, the
Constitutional Treaty represents very little progress on the status quo ante. Despite
early pressures in this direction by the German La¨nder, the Convention ruled out the
adoption of a catalogue of competences so that the Treaty has largely left unaltered
the division of competences (Bo¨rzel, this volume p.253).
Is this necessarily a negative outcome for the EU? Some authors, such as Swenden
(2004), have argued against the adoption of a catalogue of competences for the EU. In
this volume, both Baier and Church and Dardanelli show that federations have always
been bedevilled by the necessity of adapting relatively rigid legal structures to the
rapidly changing context in which they operate. Baier vividly points out that the foun-
ders of the Canadian federal state were unable to predict which areas of public policy
would be crucial in the future and this ultimately led to a more decentralized system
than originally envisaged: some marginal issues are now dealt with at the federal
level while the provinces control crucial areas of policy-making. Moreover, the need































constitution in the exercise of power and competences, and often to a wholesale blur-
ring of the division of competences in the context of an increasingly cooperative
system. In this light, the Convention’s rejection of a catalogue of competences in
favour of a relatively open distribution of responsibilities may be seen as a wise
decision.
Furthermore, the possibility of reaching an ‘ideal’ distribution of competences by
consensus is nothing more than an illusion. Most such attempts draw from the literature
on fiscal federalism (e.g. Oates, 1999; Alesina and Wacziarg, 1999), which is largely
economic in character. Yet, their economic approach ignores the profoundly political
dimension of the allocation of policy-making competences. Hable refers to a recent
example of the application of the theory of fiscal federalism to the division of
powers in the EU which found agriculture and defence to be the two policy areas
most out of line with the theory’s predictions/prescriptions.4 Anyone familiar with
the history of the EU, the distribution of preferences among its states and its
decision-making rules, would scarcely be surprised to find that agriculture is dealt
with at the central level while defence is decentralized in Europe. Closely related to
this issue are those of fiscal harmonization and redistribution. The political nature
of the debate is even more clearly on display here than in other policy areas. As
indicated by the experiences on the one hand, of Germany and Canada – with extensive
territorial re-distribution, and Switzerland and the US, with little or no territorial re-dis-
tribution – on the other, the conflict between advocates and opponents of significant
fiscal powers and redistribution at the central level is in essence an intensely political
conflict between equality on the one hand and freedom on the other. More equality
between citizens across the federation almost inevitably implies less fiscal freedom
for the component units, while the preservation of the latter almost invariably perpetu-
ates inequalities. In the pluri-national context of the EU, of course, this conflict is
further exacerbated by the desire to retain re-distribution and fiscal powers within
national control as defining features of the nation state. Likewise, it could be argued
that there is a strong theoretical rationale for running defence at the Union level,
as the resulting economies of scale and of rationalization would enable the EU to
enhance very significantly its military capabilities in relation to defence expenditures.
However, for reasons of both substance and symbolism – ranging from different geo-
political objectives to the status of the national service – it has proved very difficult for
the EU to make progress in this field.
At a theoretical level, different distributions of competences produce different models
of federalism. As Bo¨rzel reminds us (this volume, p.248), two main types have been
identified in the literature: dual and cooperative federalism. While in the former com-
petences are allocated by policy sectors rather than policy function, in the latter the
central level legislates and the regional level implements, and regional fiscal
autonomy is limited. The pre-Civil War US and, to a lesser extent, Canada are the
classical examples of dual federalism, whereas Germany is the paradigmatic model
of cooperative federalism, with Switzerland also displaying many cooperative features
but not fully fitting into either model. The distinction between the two types has become
less clear-cut however, as dual systems have acquired cooperative features over time. In
the light of this categorization, the EU can be defined as a largely cooperative system, in































Union level and implementation at the state and regional levels – and the states’
involvement in policy-making at the central level is pervasive.
The exercise of policy-making competences by the Union thus remains based on the
principle of conferral, i.e. that competences are conferred on the Union by its member
states, which retain all powers not explicitly delegated to the Union. This is in line with
the constitutional practice in Switzerland, Germany and the US, but not with Canada
and Belgium where residual competences lie with central government. However, as
Baier and Swenden show, the Canadian and Belgian constitutions spell out in detail
the powers delegated to the provinces and the regions, giving them a constitutional
guarantee. What sets the EU apart from the countries analysed in this volume,
however, is the degree of asymmetry of the system, which is left largely unaltered
by the Constitutional Treaty. While in these federations, with the partial exception
of Belgium, all regional units have the same policy-making powers and are thus in
the same relationship with the federal centre, this is not the case in the EU.
In considering the likely evolution of the division of competences in the EU under
the Constitutional Treaty, the historical evolution of the main federations is instructive.
Here the German (and, to a lesser extent, the Swiss) experience is one of slow but sig-
nificant centralization over time, to the point where some question whether Germany
has become a ‘unitary state in disguise’ (Abromeit, 1992). By contrast, as Baier
shows in his contribution to this volume, Canada has largely resisted this shift of
power to the federal level despite the centralist bias of the 1867 Constitutional Act
and the fact that the federal level has retained control over the bulk of taxation. The
different degrees of centralization in Germany and Switzerland on the one hand and
Canada on the other appear closely related to the pattern of evolution of welfare pol-
icies in the three countries. While in the other federations, the shift of policy-making
powers to the centre has gone hand-in-hand with the expansion of welfare programmes
run at that level, this is less true of Canada where welfare policies have remained over-
whelmingly in the hands of the provinces. In accounting for this Canadian exception,
beyond the role played by the heterogeneity of preferences among the provinces, Baier
argues that clarity of jurisdictions, based on the double listing of powers in the consti-
tution, has been crucial. In contrast, strong identification with the federation has con-
tributed to legitimating centralization in Germany, while the weakening of differences
between cantons together with the flexibility of the constitution have permitted the
limited amount of centralization seen in Switzerland.5
Both Bo¨rzel and Church and Dardanelli expect further centralization of power in the
EU, albeit at a gradual and incremental pace. Bo¨rzel also argues that the current div-
ision of competences leaves the Union with a problem of ‘output legitimacy’ as well
as of ‘input legitimacy’ – or the ‘dual legitimacy problem’. The lack of output legiti-
macy is created by the absence of significant stabilization and redistribution policies at
the Union level coupled with the constraints that other features of the EU system –
chiefly state aid and budget deficit rules – place on state policies in these areas. The
Constitutional Treaty’s failure to confer taxation powers on the Union prevents it
from engaging in substantial redistribution, which means, according to Bo¨rzel (this
volume, p.254), that the EU’s output legitimacy will remain deficient.
What are the lessons for the EU from these experiences, and can subsidiarity, as out-































observers, especially in the UK, are more concerned with limiting the shift of powers
from the states to the Union rather than increasing it. In this respect, the Constitutional
Treaty’s provisions related to subsidiarity may be significant, though it is unclear how
effective national parliaments will be in policing subsidiarity, given their patchy record
at overseeing European affairs thus far coupled with the problem of their general over-
load.6 The provisions of the Constitutional Treaty in the area of competence allocation
and subsidiarity thus do not constitute a dramatic change for the EU, and their impact is
likely to be limited.
Inter-governmental Relations and Dispute Resolution
Whatever the allocation of competences across the various levels of the EU political
system, inter-governmental relations are a crucial aspect of governance in multi-
level systems. Inter-governmental relations take place both vertically and horizontally.
Vertical relations are also shaped by the form of bicameralism in a system and the
overall nature of the representation of regional units at the federal level. While horizon-
tal relations are usually conducted on the basis of equality of participants, vertical
relations between the federal centre and regional units usually take on a hierarchical
character both because of the widespread principle that federal law prevails over
regional law and because of the usually greater resources at the disposal of the
federal centre. Hence, vertical relations between levels of government typically gener-
ate jurisdictional conflicts that need to be resolved through various channels for the
system to work effectively. Two broad types of dispute resolution mechanisms are
usually distinguished in the literature: judicial and political. The former entrusts a judi-
cial body, such as a constitutional court, with the power to rule on conflicts between the
federation and regional units, while the latter relies on political mechanisms such as
negotiations between executives and inter- or intra-party agreements.
If we contrast political and judicial safeguards, a number of delicate questions arise.
Three are particularly relevant. Considering flexibility and adaptability first, political
safeguards seem to be superior to judicial ones as they allow for negotiations, compro-
mises and pragmatism to an extent that courts usually do not. Secondly, with regard to
democratic safeguards, neither system seems to be unambiguously superior to the other
since both may be argued to be democratically deficient, albeit for different reasons.7
One important aspect is that in the context of inter-governmental negotiations, the
balance of power between the regions and the centre, and the relative size and
power of the regions, are critical variables. Inter-governmental negotiations produce
an asymmetrical pattern of influence which tends to favour the larger and more
powerful regions, which may find themselves in a stronger position vis-a`-vis
the centre, and to disadvantage smaller and weaker regions. Under a judicial system,
on the other hand, there is more symmetry and equality of protection but also
greater rigidity and formalism. As Baier argues, political and judicial channels of con-
flict resolution exist in all systems – albeit in different combinations – and tensions
between the two are inevitable, though complementarity and interchangeability
usually prevail.
In all these respects, the countries reviewed here provide different models. As Baier































little formal representation of the provinces through the upper chamber of the federal
parliament, the judicial channel is also weak, and jurisdictional conflicts are regulated
through inter-governmental negotiations between the provincial governments and the
federal government. The executive nature of this system is further exacerbated by
the Westminster form of government at both the federal and the provincial levels,
which allows executives to dominate their respective parliaments. Swenden (this
volume, p.191) argues that Belgium is also a case of political rather than judicial res-
olution of jurisdictional conflicts, though political parties rather than executives are the
protagonists and agreements are thrashed out in inter-party and intra-party nego-
tiations. The dissolution of state-wide parties has facilitated this process. Switzerland
has also moved significantly towards a form of executive federalism. The traditional
form of cantonal representation through the Council of States has become a weak
form of representation, and executive channels linking cantonal executives with the
Federal Council are increasingly important fora of policy-making and conflict resol-
ution. In addition, the judicial channel is virtually absent in Switzerland. As was the
case for many in the early US, any ultimate judicial authority on the constitution is
still perceived in Switzerland as an infringement of the democratic rights of the sover-
eign people. However, in comparison to Canada, the drift towards executive federalism
in Switzerland is tempered by the semi-presidential system of government8, which
empowers parliaments at both the federal and the cantonal levels, and by the pervasive
role of direct democracy. Germany provides an example of a balanced system where,
on the one hand, vertical inter-governmental relations are extensively formalized
through the crucial role of the Federal Council, while on the other the Constitutional
Court is a powerful judicial umpire. Even more powerful, as Delaney shows, has
been the Supreme Court in shaping US federalism, chiefly through access to the
Court provided to individual litigants. Indeed, the US is the pre-eminent example of
judicial regulation of inter-governmental relations.
Both political and judicial mechanisms of inter-governmental relations and dispute
resolution are present in the EU. The EU appears to be an intermediate case where a
strong judicial context effectively protects the small states but where large states
have a disproportionate bargaining power vis-a`-vis the centre in more political areas.
The fate of the Growth and Stability Pact illustrates this quite well. The judicial dimen-
sion, however, has become very important in the EU, which makes the US experience
all the more relevant for Europe. Although the ECJ has not been designated to perform
the role of ultimate judicial arbiter, it effectively performs this role already, despite the
fact that many policy areas are held ‘concurrently’ by the Union and the states which
makes judicial policing of the division of competences rather difficult. Moreover, the
ECJ provides interpretations of European law but relies on state courts for its
implementation and, in contrast to the American experience, it has been the relation-
ship with state courts rather than the relationship with individual litigants that has
allowed the ECJ to impose its interpretation. In a similar fashion to the early US,
however, the question of so-called kompetenz-kompetenz is still unresolved in the
EU, caught between the central level’s desire to ensure uniformity of the law and
the states’ determination to defend their sovereignty. Above all, in Delaney’s words,
there remains a ‘fundamental disagreement over the meaning of the original political































How is the Constitutional Treaty going to affect this? On the one hand, it will expand
the judicial sphere by bringing new areas under the remit of the ECJ and by giving legal
force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The impact of the latter, in particular, will
be crucial as it will affect the relationship between member state and Union fundamen-
tal rights. As Hable (this volume, p.148) argues, it is possible that applying the Charter
will accelerate the ECJ’s transformation into a fully-fledged constitutional court. At the
very least, the balance between the political and the judicial channels of dispute regu-
lation will be altered to the latter’s advantage. However, the political dimension is
likely to remain prevalent as the state constitutional courts will want to retain the
ultimate authority to rule secondary European law ultra vires or in conflict with funda-
mental rights enshrined in a state’s constitution. Moreover, as Delaney (this volume,
p.235) argues, the manner in which the Constitutional Treaty is to be ratified will
reinforce the states’ claim to kompetenz-kompetenz. If the US experience is any
guide for the EU, increased access to the ECJ for individual litigants may turn out to
be a mixed blessing, as it could pit the Court against its counterparts at the national
level, which enjoy far more power and legitimacy than the US state courts of the
first half of the nineteenth century. In any case, as Baier argues, political channels of
dispute resolution are highly effective in the EU, so the best option for the Union is
to preserve them and complement them with a limited degree of judicial review
rather than going down the road of a fully judicial model, not least because the Cana-
dian experience shows that ‘in the battle between political and judicial safeguards of
federalism, the political safeguards tend to win out’ (this volume, p.219).
Governance, Democracy and Identities
As Baier argues, executive federalism in Canada has long been criticized for its demo-
cratic deficit (this volume, p.210). Cooperative federalism has also been criticized for
blurring the lines of responsibility and accountability between citizens and office-
holders. As discussed above, the European Union has developed many features typical
of both executive and cooperative federalism, which many authors believe have contrib-
uted to the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU.9 In this respect, Bo¨rzel expects the
cooperative nature of the EU system to deepen, as further centralization of policy-
making competences is likely to go hand in hand with continuing – if not deepening
– state involvement in decision-making at the Union level. The Constitutional Treaty
appears to confirm this interpretation, as it strengthens member states’ involvement at
the Union level – through the new office of president of the European Council –
while leaving largely unaltered the division of competences between the two levels.
The main contribution of the Constitutional Treaty in terms of enhancing democracy
in the EU appears to be strengthening the Parliament through extension of its involve-
ment in policy-making, extension of the co-decision procedure and the granting of
some control over the comitology system. Progress on simplification has been more
limited, however. As Hable shows (this volume, p.150), while the Constitutional
Treaty formally proposes to end the pillar system, the second pillar re-emerges
through ‘the back door’. Moreover, although there is a reduction in the number of leg-
islative instruments, this improvement has been offset by the creation of a fixed-term































the Commission is concerned, the failure to make it genuinely elected by Parliament
means that rather than choosing between the parliamentary and the presidential
model, as debated in the literature,10 the Constitutional Treaty has maintained a
middle way. Our set of case studies does not offer any clear guidance as far as execu-
tive-legislature relations are concerned, for each of the systems features a different
model and none is clearly superior to the others. The model embodied in the Consti-
tutional Treaty combines elements resembling features of the Swiss and the German
systems. While the relationship between the Commission and Parliament mirrors to
a significant extent that between the Federal Council and Parliament in Switzerland,
the powerful role played by the Council of Ministers and the European Council
echoes that of the Federal Council in Germany. The impact of the President of the
European Council on the functioning of this system is difficult to predict, beyond the
widespread fears of turf wars with the President of the Commission. In sum, in this
area as well, the provisions of the Treaty are more a sign of continuity with the
current system than an embrace of radical reforms.
The final point I would like to touch upon is the role of identities in shaping the mid-
to long-term development of the European Union. Both Church and Dardanelli and
Swenden stress the importance of identity factors in providing legitimacy to political
systems. Swenden shows how the imposition of French as the only official language
in Belgium eroded the legitimacy of the unitary Belgian state up to the post-First
World War period, whereas the granting of full linguistic and cultural autonomy to
Flanders has boosted support for the Belgian political system among Flemings in the
more recent period. Church and Dardanelli (this volume, p.161) show that respect
for minority languages is a key aspect of Swiss identity and a unifying factor for the
country. Regarding the EU, Church and Dardanelli stress that further integration and
a fortiori a transition to a federal state would only be legitimate if accompanied by a
strengthening of popular identification with the EU, which seems unlikely in the
absence of policies of explicit identity-building. Swenden summarizes one of the
key dilemmas to be faced in relation to such policies: on the one hand, ‘the entrench-
ment of national languages may prevent the emergence of a European demos’ (this
volume, p.189); on the other hand, preference for a single lingua franca could lead
to resentment and a further erosion of the EU’s legitimacy. The relationship between
Quebec and the rest of Canada provides a clear example of the issues at stake. The
pattern of collective identification in the EU is also linked to how public policy respon-
sibilities are allocated across its various levels of government. As Swenden argues, the
EU does not need as ‘thick’ an identification among citizens as do European national
states as long as it does not engage in large-scale redistribution. It follows that a dra-
matic rise in the intensity of citizen identification with the EU political system would
be required to legitimize the Union’s acquisition of significant fiscal and redistributive
powers, as many on the left advocate.
Final Remarks
Although it is not a revolutionary document, the Constitutional Treaty has the potential
to profoundly shape the evolution of the European Union in the coming decades. The































represents a remarkable achievement for the EU. Before it can acquire legal force,
however, it has to clear the most difficult hurdle – ratification in all 25 states of the
Union. Ratifying EU treaties has never been an easy process (remember Maastricht)
and this time the task is more demanding than ever. Not only are there now 25
states but, at the time of writing, no fewer than ten have declared their intention to
ratify the treaty by referendum. Among those states that have pledged to hold a refer-
endum are some, such as the Netherlands, that have never held a referendum before,
and others in which referendums are very rarely used, such as the UK, which makes
managing campaigns and predicting outcomes a tall order. Strong undercurrents of
Euroscepticism and anti-government feelings in a number of countries are likely to
make the exercise all the more difficult. All those that believe this treaty, despite its
shortcomings, represents progress for the EU should take part in this debate so as to
make the decisions on ratification – be they parliamentary or popular – as enlightened
as possible. In this context, we, as academics, have the professional duty to let our
expert knowledge shed light on some of the most controversial issues in this debate.
The comparative analyses of federal systems presented in this volume and these con-
cluding notes have been drafted in this spirit of academic contribution to public debate.
We hope readers will find them a valuable contribution.
Notes
1See, among many others, Weiler (1999) and Delaney in this volume.
2See Breuss and Eller (2003).
3Here the focus is on ‘dynamic’ centralization over time, not ‘static’ centralization at the time of
writing. By dynamic centralization I mean the extent to which powers have shifted from the regional
to the federal level over time, while by static centralization I refer to the proportion of policy-making
competences exercised at central level relative to the regional level at a given point in time. For
instance, the former is greater in Switzerland than in Canada while the reverse is true of the latter.
4See Raunio (1999) and Holzhacker (2002) on the difficulties national parliaments face in monitoring
policy-making at the Union level and Verge´s Bausili (2002) and Raunio (2004) for a discussion applied
to the constitutional Treaty in particular.
5See Shapiro (1986) and Le Sueur (1991), among many others, on the debate on democracy and judicial
review.
6See Lijphart (1999: 119) on the semi-presidential nature of Switzerland’s executive-legislature
relations.
7The literature on democracy in the EU expands rapidly. See Andersen and Eliassen (1996) and Følles-
dal and Koslowski (1998) for the standard ‘democratic deficit’ argument and Moravcsik (2002),
Zweifel (2002) and Crombez (2003) for sceptical views.
8See, among others, Lord and Beetham (2001) and Hix et al. (2003) for the debate on parliamentarism
and presidentialism in the EU.
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